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Cosmology, Ontology, and the
Travail of Biblical Language
LANGDON B. GILKEY•

ED. NOTB: This article appeared in the
}0Nr1111l of R•ligio11, July 1961, pp. 194-205,
copyright 1961 by the University of Chica.go.
Permission ro reprint it in our jourml was graciously gnmrcd by the University of Chica.go
Press. We make it available to our reader
s
as
one schol:ir's interesting analysis of one modern
attempt to understand Scripture without thereby
endorsing the author"s position or his solution
of the problem.

T

HIS is a p:iper on the intelligibility of
some of the concepts of what we commonly call "biblic:il theology," or sometimes "the biblic:il point of view," or "the
biblic:il faith." Although my remarks relate
only to the Old Testament :ind at some
points concern only two distinguished
American representatives of the "biblic:il
viewpoint," G. E. Wright and B. Anderson, the number of scholars of both tesmments whose thoughts are based on the socalled "biblical view," and so who sh:ire
the difficulties outlined below, is very great
indeed. My paper stems not from a repudiation of that theological point of view.
Speaking personally, I share it, and each
time I theologize I use its main categories;
but I find myself confused about it when
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I ponder it critically, and this paper organizes and states rather than resolves that
confusion.
My own confusion results from what
I feel to be the basic posture, and problem,
of contemporary theology: it is half liberal
and modern, on the one hand, and half
biblical and orthodox, on the other, i.e.,
its world view or cosmology is modem,
while its theologic:il language is biblical
and orthodox. Since this posture in two
different worlds is the source of the difficulties and ambiguities which exist in current biblical theology, I had best begin with
its elucidation.
Our problem begins with the liberal
repudiation of orthodoxy. One facet of
this repudiation was the rejection of the
category "revelation through the special
activity of God," what we now call "special
revelation," "Heilsgeschichte," or popularly
"the mighty aets of God." Orthodoxy, taking the Bible literally, had seen this special
activity in the simple biblical twofold pattern of wondrous events (e.g., unexpected
children, marvelous victories in battle, pillars of fire, etc.) , on the one hand, and, on
the other hand, a divine voice that spoke
a.crual words tO Abraham, tO Moses, and
to their prophetic followen. This orthodox
view of the divine self-manifestation
through special evenu and aaual voices
offended
liberalA mind on two distinct
Vassarthe
College.
grounds: ( 1) In undencanding God's acts
and speech literally and univocally, the
orthodox belief in special revelation denied
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the reign of causal law in the phenomenal
realm of space and rime, or at least denied
that that reign of law had obtained in biblical days. To the liberals, therefore, this
orthodox view of revelation represented
a primitive, prescientific form of religion
and should be modernized. (2) Special
revelation denied that ultimately significant
religious troth is universally available to
mankind, or at least in continuity with experiences universally shared by all men.
On these two grounds of causal order and
universality liberalism reinterpreted the
concept of revelation: God's aas ceased to
be special, particular, and concerned with
phenomenal reality (for example, the stopping of the sun, a visible pillar of .fire, and
audible voices). Rather, the divine aaivity
became the continual, aeative, immanent
activity of God, an activity which worked
through the natural order and which could
therefore be apprehended in universal human experiences of dependence, of harmony, and of value-experiences which
in tum issued in developed religious feeling and religious consciousness. The demands both of world order and of universality were thus met by this liberal
reconstruction of religion: The immanent
divine activity was now consistent throughout experience, and whatever special activity there was in religious knowledge was
located subjeaively in the uniquely gifted
religious leader or culture which possessed
deeper insight and so discovered deeper
religious truth.
Against this reduction of God's activity
to his general inftuence and of revelation
to subjective human insight, neo-orthodoxy, and with it biblical theology, reaaed
violently. For them, revelation was not
a subjective human aeation but an objec-
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rive divine activity; God was not an inference from religious experience but he who
acts in special events. .And Hebrew religion was not the result of human religious
genius or insight into the consistent continuity of God's activity; rather, biblical
religion was the response of faith to and
the recital of the "mighty aas of God."
Both contemporary systematic and contemporary biblical theology are in agreed opposition to liberalism in emphasizing that
revelation is not a possibility of universal
human experience but comes through the
objeaive, prior, self-revelation of God in
special events in response to which faith
and witness arise. Whether or not this
self-understanding is accurate is a question
we shall tty to answer.
Contemporary systematic and biblical
theology have, however, often failed to
note that in repudiating the liberal emphasis on the universal and immanent as
against the special and objective activity
of God, they have 1101 repudiated the
liberal insistence on the causal continuum
of space-time experience. Thus contemporary theology does not expect, nor does
it speak of, wondrous divine eventS on the
surface of natural and historical life. The
causal nexus in space and time which Enlightenment science and philosophy introduced into the Western mind and which
was assumed by liberalism is also assumed
by modern theologians and scholars; since
they participate in the modern world of
science both intellectually and existentially,
they can scarcely do anything else.
Now this assumption of a causal order
among phenomenal events, and therefore
of the authority of the scientific interpretation of observable events, makes a great
difference to the validity one assigns to
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biblical narratives and so to the way one
understands their meaning. Suddenly a vast
panoply of divine deeds and evcnrs recorded in Scripture are no longer regarded
as having actually happened. Not only, for
example, do the six days of creation, the
historical fall in Eden, and the flood seem
to us historically untrue, but even more the
majority of divine deeds in the biblical
history of the Hebrew people become
what we choose ro call symbols rather than
plain old historical facts. To mention only
a few: Abraham's unexpected child; the
many divine visitations; the words and
directions to the patriarchs; the plagues
visited on the Egyptians; the pillar of fire;
the parcing of the seas; the verbal deliverance of covenantal law on Sinai; the strategic and logistic help in the conquest; the
audible voice heard by the prophets; and
so on - all these "acts" vanish from the
plane of historical reality and enter the
never-never land of "religious interpretll.tion" by the Hebrew people. Therefore
when we read what the Old Testament
seems to say God did, or what precritical
commentators said God did (sec Calvin),
and then look at a modern interpretation
of what God did in biblical times, we
find a tremendous difference: the wonder
events and the verbal divine commentaries,
commands, and promises are gone. Whatever the Hebrews believed, 'Wtl believe that
the biblical people lived in the same causal
continuum of space and time in which we
live, and so one in which no divine wonders transpire and no divine voices were
heard. Nor do we believe, incidentally,
that God could have done or commanded
certain "unethical" deeds like destrO)'ing
Sodom and Gomorrah or commanding the
murder of the Amalekites. The modern
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assumption of the world order has stripped
bare our view of the biblical history of
all the divine deeds observable on the
surface of history, as our modern humanitarian ethical view has stripped the
biblical God of most of his mystery and
offensiveness.
Put in the language of contemporuy
semantic discussion, both the biblical and
the orthodox understanding of theological
language was univocal. That is, when God
was said to have "acted," it was believed
that he had performed an observable act
in space and time so that he functioned
as docs any secondary cause; and when he
was said to have "spoken," it was believed
that an audible voice was heard by the
person addressed. In other words, the
words "act" and "speak" were used in the
same sense of God as of men. We deny
this univocal understanding of theological
words. To us, theological verbs such as "t0
act," "to work," "to do," "ro speak," "ro
reveal," etc., have no longer the literal
meaning of observable actions in space
and time or of voices in the air. The
denial of wonders and voices has thus
shifted our theological language from the
univocal to the analogical. Our problem
is, therefore, twofold: (•) We have not
realized that this crucial shift has taken
place, and so we think we arc merely
speaking the biblical language because we
use the same words. We do use these
words, but we use them analogically rather
than univocally, and these are vastly different usages. ( b) Unless one knows in some
sense what the analogy means, how the
analogy is being used, and what it poina
to, an analogy is empty and unintelligible;
that is, it becomes equivocal language.
This is the aux of our present diSiculty;
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let us now return to biblical theology to
try to show just how serious it is.
We have said that there is a vast difference between ourselves and the Bible concerning cosmology and so concerning the
concrete character of the divine activity in
history and that this difference has changed
biblical language from a univocal to an
analogical form. If, then, this difference is
there, what effect has it had on the way
we understand the narratives of Scripture,
filled as they undoubtedly are with divine
wonders and the divine ,•oice? A perusal of such commentators as Wright and
Anderson will reveal that, generally speaking, there has been a radical reinterpretation of these narratives, a reinterpretation
that h:is been threefold. First, the divine
activity called the "mighty deeds of God"
is now restricted to one crucial event, the
Exodus-convenant complex of occurrence.
Whatever else God may not have done,
we say, here he really acted in the history
of the Hebrew people, and so here their
faith was born and given its form.
Second, the vast panoply of wonder and
voice events that preceded the Exoduscovenant event, in effect the patriarchical
narratives, are now taken to be Hebrew
interpretatioos of their own historical past
based on the faith gained at the Exodus.
Por us, then, these narratives represent not
so much his1orus of what God actually did
and said as fllll't1bl11s expressive of the faith
the post-Exodus Jews had, namely, belief
in a God who was active, did deeds, spoke
promises and commands, and so on. Third,
the biblical accounts of the post-Exodus
life-for example, the proclamation and
a,diJiation of the law, the conquest, and
the prophetic movement- are understood
as the covenant people's interpretation
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through their Exodus faith of their continuing life and history. Having known
God at the Exodus event, they were able
now to understand his relation to them in
terms of free covenant and law and to see
his hand in the movement of their subsequent history. In sum, therefore, we may
say that for modern biblical theology the
Bible is no longer so much a book containing a description of God's actual acts
and words as it is a. book containing Hebrew interpretations, "creative interpreta•
tions" as we call them, which, like the
parable of Jonah, tell stories of God's
deeds and man's response to express the
theological beliefs of Hebrew religion.
Thus the Bible is a. book descriptive not
of the acts of God but of Hebrew religion.
And though God is the subject of all the
verbs of the Bible, Hebrew religious faith
and Hebrew minds provide the subjects of
all the verbs in modern books on the
meaning of the Bible. Incidentally, we
a.void admitting these perennial human
subjects by putting our verbs in the pas•
sive voice: "was seen to be," "was believed
to be," etc. For us, then, the Bible is a
book of the acts Hebrews believed God
might have done and the words he might
have said had he done and said them but of course we recognize he did not.
The difference between this view of the
Bible as a parable illustrative of Hebrew
religious faith and the view of the Bible
as a. direct narrative of God's actual deeds
and words is so vast that it scarcely needs
comment. It makes us wonder, despite ourselves, what, in fact, do we moderns think
God ditl in the centuries preceding the incarnation; what 111.u his mighty acts?
The nub of this problem is the fact
that, while the object of biblical recital
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is God's acts, the object of biblical theological inquiry is biblical faith- that is
to say, biblical theology is, like liberalism,
a study of Hebrew religion. Thus while
the language of biblical theology is Godcentcred, the whole is included within
gigantic parentheses marked "'human religion." This means that biblical theology
is fundamentally liberal in form and that
without translation it provides an impossible vehicle for biblical-theological confession, since it is itself a witness to Hebrew religion and not to the real acts of
God. For of course the real action and
revelation of God must p recede and be
outside these great parentheses of Hebrew
faith if the content of that faith -115 a
response to God's acrs - be not self-conuadictory and illusory, beguiling but untrue, like the poetic religion in Santayana's
naturalism.
As we noted, most modern Old Testament commentators reduce the mighty acts
of God to one event: the Exodus-covenant
event. Let us, therefore, look at our understanding of this event, for nround it center
the problems we see in biblical theology.
Here, we arc told, God acted, and in so
doing, he revealed himself ro the Hebrew
people and established his covenant relation to them. Since current biblical theology is, like most contemporary theology,
passionately opposed to conceptions of God
based on natural theology or on general
religious experience, we may assume that
before this initial divine deed there was
no valid knowledge of God at all: if knowledge of God is based only on his revclnrory
acts, then prior to those acts he must have
been quite unknown. Exodus-Sinai, then,
is the pivotal point of biblical religion.
Now this means that the Exodus event
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has a confessional as well as a hisrorical
interest for us. The question of what God
did at Sinai is, in other words, not only a
question for the scholar of Semitic religion
and theology, it is even more a question
for the contemporary believer who wishes
to make his witness today to the acts of
God in hismry; and so it poses a question
for the systematic theologian who wishes
today to understand God as the Lord who
acted there. We arc thus not asking merely
the historical question about what the Hebrews believed or said God did - that is
a question for the scholar of the hisrory of
religions, Semitic branch. Rnther, we are
asking the systematic question, that is, we
are seeking ro state in faith what we believe God acru:dly did. For, as biblical
scholars have reminded us, a religious
confession that is biblical is a direct reciral of God's acts, not a recital of someone else's belief, even if it be a recital of
a Hebrew recitation. If, therefore, Christian theology is to be the recitation in
faith of God's mighty acts, it must be
composed of confessional and systematic
sratements of the form: "We believe that
God did so and so," and not composed
of statements of biblical theology of the
form: "'The Hebrews believed that God
did so and so."
If we had asked an orthodox theologian
like Calvin this confessional and systematic
question: "What do you believe God did
at the Exodus?" he would have given us
a clear answer. "'Look at the book of
Exodus," he would have answered, "and
see what it says that God did." And in his
commentary he recites that deed of God
just as it appears on the pages of Saipture; that is, his confessional understanding of the event includes the divine call
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heard by Moses, all the plagues, the pillar tain . . . which formed the people into
of fire, the parting of the seas, the lordly a nation." 3 Considering that each writer
voice booming forth from Sinai, and the clearly feels that the Bible is about the
divinely proclaimed promises and legal real acts of God, that our religion is
conditions of the covenant. At the Ref- founded thereon, and that Christian theormation, therefore, statements in biblical ology must recite these acts of God, this
theology and in systematic theology coa- unconcern with the character of the one
lesced because the theologian's understand- act that God is believed actually to have
ing of what God did was drawn with no done is surprising.
change from the simple narratives of
In any case, this understanding of the
Scripture, and because the verbs of the event illustrates the uneasy posture in two
Bible were thus interpreted univocally worlds of current biblical theology and
throughout. Thus in Reformation theol- thus its confusion about two types of theoogy, if anywhere, the Bible "speaks its own logical language. modern
When
biblical
language" or "speaks for itself" with a writers speak theologically of the revelaminimum of theological mediation.
tory event, their attention focuses on the
When, however, one asks Professors prior and objective event, and they speak
Wright or Anderson the systematic or in the biblical and orthodox terms of a God
confessional question: "What did God ac- who speaks and acts, of divine initiation
tually do in the Exodus-Sinai event, what and human response, and of revelation
actually happened there?" the answer is through mighty, divine deeds in history.
not only vastly different from the scriptural When, however, they function as scientific
and orthodox accounts, but, in fact, it is historians or archeologists and ask what
extremely elusive t0 discover. Strangely actually happened, they speak of that same
enough, neither one gives the questions prior event in purely naturalistic terms as
"What did God realZ, do?" "What 111111 "an ordinary though unusual event," or as
his mighty act?" much attention. First of "an East wind blowing over the Reed Sea."
all they deny that there was any mirac- Thus they repudiate all the conaete eleulous chamaer to the event, since "the , ments that in the biblical account made
Hebrews knew no miracles." They llSSCtt, the event itself unique and so gave content
therefore,
that outwardly the event was to their theological concept of a special
indistinguishable from other events,1 reve- divine deed. In other words, they continue
lation to the Hebrews always being depend- to use the biblical and orthodox theologent on faith. And finally they assert that ical language of divine activity and speech,
probably there was a perfectly natural ex- but they have dispensed with the wonders
planation of the objective side of the and voices that gave univocal meaning,
event. As Anderson
rescue
puts it, the
of and thus content, t0 the theological words
the Hebrews resulted "probably from the "God acts" and "God speaks."
East wind blowing over the Reed Sea"; 2
This dual posture in both biblical orand in a single sentence Wright makes one thodoxy and modern cosmology, and the
mysterious reference to "certain experi- consequent rejection of univocal meanings
ences that took place at the Holy moun- for our theological pbnses, raises our first
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question: "Are the main words and cate- God is he who acts, meaning by this that
gories in biblical theology meaningful?" God does unique and special actions in
If they are no longer used univocally to history. And yet when we ask: "All right,
mean observable deeds and audible voices, what has he done?" no answer can appardo they have any intelligible content? ently be given. Most of the acts recorded
If they are in fact being used as analogies in Scripture turn out to be "interpretations
( God acts, but not as men act; God speaks, by Hebrew faith," and we arc sure that
but not with an audible voice), do we they, like the miracles of the Buddha, did
have any idea at all to what sort of deed not really happen at all. And the one reor communication these analogies refer? maining objective act, the Exodus, becomes
Or are they just serious-sounding, biblical- on analysis "the East wind blowing over
sounding, and theological-sounding words the Reed Sea," that is, an event which is
to which we can, if pressed, assign no objectively or ontologically of the same
meaning? Note I am not making the em- class as any other event in space and time.
piricist or positivist demand that we give Now if this event is validly t0 be called
a naturalistic, empirically verifiable mean- a mighty act of God, an event in which
ing to these theological words, a meaning he really did something special- as opoutside the context of faith and commit- posed to our just believing he did, which
ment. I am asking for a confessional- would be religious subjectivism and metatheological meaning, that is, a meaning physical naturalism - then, ontologically,
based on thought about our faith concern- this must in some sense be more than an
ing what we mean by these affirmations of ordinary run-of-the-mill event. It may be
faith. The two affirmations I especially epistemologically indistinguishable from
wish to consider arc, first, "God has acted other events to those without faith, but for
mightily and specially in history for our those of faith it must be objectively or
salvation, and so God is he who aces in ontologically dilferent from other evenrs.
history." And second, "Our knowledge of Otherwise, there is no mighty act, but
God is based not on our discovery of him only our belief in it, and God is the God
but on God's revelation of himself in his- who in fact does not act. And then our
torical events." My point is that, when we theological analogies of "aa" and "deed"
analyze what we mean by these theological have no referent, and so no meaning. But
phrases, we can give no concrete or speci- in current biblical theology such an ontofiable content so that our analogies at pres- logically special character to the event.
ent are empty and meaningless. The result a special character known perhaps only by
is that, when we push the analysis of these faith but really "out there" nevertheless,
analogical words funher, we find that what is neither specified nor specifiable. For in
we actually mean by them contradicts the the Bible itself that special character was
intent of these theological phrases.
understood to be the very wooden and
Let us take the category of "mighty act" voices which we have rejected, and nothing
fust. Perhaps the most important theolog- has appeared in modern biblical thought
ical affirmation that modern biblical the- to take their place. Only an ontology of
ology draws from the Scripture is that events specifying what God's relation to
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ordinary events is like, and thus what his
relation t0 special events might be, could
fill the now empty analogy of mighty acts,
void since the denial of the mir.lculous.
Meanwhile, in contemporary biblical
theology, which dares to suay into the
forbidden precincts of cosmology and ontology only far enough to deny miracles,
all that can be said about the event leaves
the analogy of the mighty act quite empty.
We deny the miraculous character of the
event and say its cause was merely an East
wind, and then we point to the unusual
response of Hebrew faith. For biblical
theology, that which remains special about
the event, therefore, is only its subjective
result, namely, the faith response. But
if we then ask what this Hebrew response
was to, what God did, we are offered
merely an objectively natural event. But
this means merely that the Hebrews, as
a religious people, were unusual; it does
not mean that the event t0 which they
responded was unusual. One can only conclude, therefore, that the mighty act of
God is not his objective activity in history
but only his inward incitement of a religious response to an ordinary event within
the space-time continuum. If this is what
we mean, then clearly we have left the
theological framework of "mighty act with
faith response" and returned to Schleiermacher's liberalism, in which God's general activity is consistent throughout the
continuum of space-time events and in
which special religious feeling apprehends
the presence of God in and through ordim.ry finite events. Thus our theological
analogy of the mighty act seems t0 have no
specifiable referent or meaning: like the
eumples of God's speaking, the only case
mms out on analysis t0 be an example, not
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of God's activity at all, but of Hebrew
insight based on their religious experience.
A similar problem arises when we aslc
what is meant by "revelation" in a modern
mighty acts theology. The correlation of
ordinary event and faith response is basic
for contemporary theology: no event, we
say, becomes revelatory ( i. e., is known to
be revelatory) unless faith sees in it the
work of God. Now this correlation of ordinary event with discerning faith is intelligible enough once the covenant relation between God and his people has been
established: then God is already known,
faith has already arisen, and so God's work
can be seen by faith in the outwardly ordinary events of Hebrew existence. But
can the rule that revelatory events arc only
discerned by faith be equally applied to the
event in which faith takes its origin? Can
it, in other words, provide a theological
understanding of origi11ali11g revelation,
that is, of God's original self-manifestation
to man, in which man does not discern an
already known God but in which God
reveals himself to men who know nothing
of him? Certainly it is logical to contend
that faith cannot be presupposed in the
event which purportedly effects the origination of faith.
When we consider the description that
biblical theology makes of the origination
of faith, moreover, the problems in this
view seem vast indeed. Theologically it is
asserted that God is not known through
general, natuml, historical, or inward experience. Thus presumably the Hebrews
fled from Egypt uncognizant of God, having in their minds no concepts at all of
the transcendent, active, covenant deity of
later Hebrew religion. How, then, did
they come to know this God? The an-
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swer of contemporary theology, of course.
is that at this point the East wind over the
Red Sea rescued the Hebrew people from
the Egyptians, and so according to Wright,
their faith arose 115 the only 115sumption
that could make sense of this great stroke
of good fortune: "They did not have the
power themselves ( to effect the rescue);
there was only one explanation available
to them. That was the assumption that a
great God had seen their afflictions, had
taken pity on them. . . ." 4 Thus Hebrew
faith is here presented as a human hypothesis, a religious assumption arising out of
intuition and insight into the meaning of
an unusual and crucial experience.
One can only wonder at this statement.
First of all in what sense can one speak of
revelatiou here? Is this not a remarkably
clear example of natural religion or natural
theology? TI1e origination of Hebrew faith
is explained as a religious 11SSumption based
on an unusual event but one which was
admittedly consistent with, of the same
order as, other events within the naturehistory continuum. In what way does this
faith come from God and what he has
done rather than from man and what he
has discovered, or even just poetically
imagined? It seems to be only the reli,gious insight and imagination of the Jews
that has created and developed this monotheistic assumption out of the twists and
turns of their historical experience. And
second, why was there "only one explanation available" to them? Why was this
response so inevimbly tied with this event
as to make us feel that the response was
revealed in the event? Why could not the
Hebrews have come to believe in a god of
the East Wind, or a benevolent Fate, or
.any of the thousands of deities of unusual
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events that human religion has created?
Surely on neo•orthodox principles, the theological concept or religious assumption
least available to the imagination of men
who knew not God was that of the transcendent, covenant God of history-exactly the assumption now called "inevitable" when an East wind had rescued
them.
Furthermore, we should recall that for
biblical theology the entire meaning of
the concept of revelation through divine
activity rather than through subjective experience or insight hangs on this one act
of divine revelation. Thus the admission
at this viml point that Hebrew faith was
a daring human hypothesis based on a natural but unusual event is very puzzling.
For it indicates that despite our .Boweiy
theological language, our actual understanding of Hebrew religion remains inclosed within liberal categories. When we
are 11Sked about what actually happened,
and how revelation actually occurred, all
we can say is that in the continuum of
the natural order an unusual event rescued
the Hebrews from a sad fate; from this
they concluded there must be somewhere
a God who loved them; thus they interpreted their own past in terms of his dealings with them and created all the other
familiar characteristics of Hebrew religion:
covenant, law, and prophecy. This understanding of Hebrew religion is strictly
"liberal": it pictures reality as a consistent
world order and religious truth as a human interpretation based on religious experience. And yet at the same time,, having castigated the liberals, who at least
knew what their fundamental theological
principles were, we proclaim that our real
categories are orthodox: God aas, God
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spealcs. and God reveals. Furthermore, we
dodge all aiticism by insisting that, because biblical and Christian ideas of God
are "revealed," they are, unlike the assumptions and hypotheses of culture and of
other religions, beyond inspection by the
philosophical and moral criteria of man's
general experience.
What has happened is clear: because of
our modem cosmology, we have stripped
what we regard as "the biblical point of
view" of all its wonders and voices. This
in turn has emptied the Bible's theological
categories of divine deeds and divine revelations of all their univocal meaning, and
we have made no effort to understand what
these categories
analogies.
might mean as
Thus, when we have sought to understand
Hebrew religion, we have unconsciously
fallen back on the liberal assumptions that
do make some sense to us. What we
desperately need is a theological ontology
that will put intelligible and credible
meanings into our analogical categories of
divine deeds and of divine self-manifestation through events.
Our point can perhaps be summarized
by saying that, without such an ontological
basis, the language of biblical theology is
neither univocal nor analogical but equivocal, and so it remains empty, abstract, and
self-contradietory. It is empty and abstract
because it can provide us with no conaete
cases. We say the biblical God acts, but
we can give neither concrete examples nor
analogical description; we say he speaks,
and no illumative dialogues can be specified. What has happened is that, u modern men perusing the Scriptures, we have
rejected as invalid all the innumerable
cues of God's aaing and speaking; but
as necH>tthodox men looking for a word
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from the Bible, we have induced from all
these cases the theological generalization
that God is he who acts and speaks. This
general truth about God we then assert
while denying all the particular cases on
the basis of which the generalization was
first made. Consequently, biblical theology
is left with 11 set of theological abstractions,
more abstract than the dogmas of scholasticism, for these are concepts with no
known concreteness. Finally, our language
is self-contradict0ry because, while we use
the language of orthodoxy, what we really
mean is concepts and explanations more
appropriate to liberal religion. For if there
is any middle ground between the observable deed and the audible dialogue which
we reject, and what the liberals used to
call religious experience and religious insight, then it has not yet been spelled out.
In the cases both of the mighty act of
God and of the speech of God, such
11 spelling-out is an enterprise in philosophical theology. While certainly this enterprise cannot be unbiblical, it must at least
be onrological and philosophical enough
to provide theological meaning to our biblical analogies of divine deeds and words,
since today we have abandoned the univocal, literal meanings of these words. One
example may illustrate. Commenting on
the "biblical view," Wright says: "He
[God] is to be known by what he has
done and said, by what he is now doing
and saying; and he is known when we do
what he commands us to do." 11 Unless we
can give some analogical meaning to these
concepts "do," "say," and "command," we
arc unable to make any confessional sense
at all of this sentence, since every aaua1
cue of doing, saying, or comrnanding .referred to in the Scripture has for ua van-
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ished into subjective Hebrew religious experience and interpretation. One might
almost conclude that without a theological
ontology, biblical theology is in danger of
becoming a version of Santayana's poetic
view of religion, in which believing man
paints the objective flux of matter in the
pretty subjective pictures of religious language and myth.
Two changes in our thinking can, I believe, rescue us from these dilemmas. First
of all, biblical theology must take cosmology and ontology more seriously. Despite the undeniable but irrelevant fact
that the Hebrews did not think much
about cosmology, cosmology docs make
a difference in hercmcneutics. When we
say "God acts," we mean something different cosmologically than the writers of
JED and P, or even than Calvin, did. Thus
the modern discipline of "biblical theology" is more tricky than we perhaps assumed when we thought we could just
lift out theological abstractions {God
speaks, God acts) from the narratives of
Scripture and, calling them "the biblical
point of view," act as if they were the
only theology we needed. If in doing this
we pretend that we are "just letting the
Bible speak for itself," we are fooling no
one but ourselves. Aetually we are translating the biblical view into our own, at
least in rejecting its concrete content of
wonders and voices and so changing these
categories from univocal concepts to empty
analogies. But we have done this translating without being aware of the change we
have made and thus without thinking out
the problems in which this shift in cosmology and the resultant translation of
biblical language involve us. Hence th~
abstraetness and self-conuad.ictory charac-
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ter of our categories in present ''biblial
theology." To speak the biblial word in
a contemporary setting is a difficult lh•ological task as well as a difficult existential
task.
This means in turn that two very different enterprises must be distinguished
in Christian theology, for they cannot be
confused without fatal results. First there
is the job of stating what the biblial
writers meant to say, a statement couched
in the Bible's own terms, cosmological,
historical, and theological. This is "biblical theology," and its goal is to .find what
the Bible truly says -whether what in
specific instances the Bible says seems to
us in fact to be true or not. Then there is
the other task of stating what that Word
might mean for us today, what we believe
God actually to have done. This is confessional and systematic theology, and its
object is what 1110 believe the truth about
God and about what he has done to be.
To use Wright's language, we must distinguish between Hebrew recital {biblical
theology) and oar recital {confessional
or systematic theology) if our confessions
are to make any sense at all. To confuse
the two, and to try to make a study of what
the biblical writers said also and at the
same time an attempt to say what we believe to be true about God, is fatal and
leads to the kind of confusions we have
outlined.
Second, it is clear that throughout this
paper our central problem has been that,
in the shift of cosmology from ancient to
modern, .fundamental theological concepts
have so changed their meaning as almost
to have lost all reference. The phrases
"God aas" and "God speaks," whatever
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they may ultimately mean to us, do not
signify the wonders and voices of ancient
days. As we have seen, it is no good repeating the abstract verbs "to act" and "to
speak," if we have no intelligible referents
with which to replace the vanished wonders and voices; nnd if we use these categories as analogies without :my discussion
of what we mean by them, we contradict
ourselves over and over. When we use the
analogies "mighty act," "unique revelatory
event," or "God speaks to his people,"
therefore, we must also try to understand
what we might mean in systematic theology by the general activity of God. Unless we have some conception of how God
:acts in ordinary events, we can hardly
know what our analogical words mean
when we say: "He acts uniquely in this
event" or "this event is 11. special divine
deed." Thus if we are to give content to
the biblical analogy of a mighty net, and
so to our theological concepts of special
revelation and salvation, we must also
have some understanding of the relation

of God ro general experience, which is the
subject of philosophical theology. Put in
terms of doctrines, this means that God's
special activity is logically connected with
bis providential activity in general historical experience, and an understanding
of the one assumes a concurrent inquiry
into the other. For this reason, while the
dependence of systematic and philosophical theology on biblical theology has long
been recognized and is obvious, the dependence of an intelligible theology that
is biblical on the cosmological and ontological inquiries of believing men, while
now less universally accepted, is nonetheless real. There is no primary discipline
in the life of the church, for all of us biblical scholars and theologians - live
and think in the present and look for the
truth in documents from the past. And
for all of us, a contemporary understanding of ancient Scriptures depends as much
on a careful analysis of our present presuppositions as it does on being learned in
the religion and faith of the past.
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